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INTRODUCTION 
For nearly forty-three years, Giles Sutherland Rich1 served as a 
member of the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.) 
and its successor court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit.2  Judge Rich is widely regarded as one of the most influential 
jurists in the area of patent law—and rightfully so.3  Less well known 
                                                          
 1. Giles Sutherland Rich was born on May 30, 1904, and died on June 9, 1999 at 
the age of ninety-five.  A graduate of Harvard College and Columbia Law School, 
Rich practiced patent and trademark law in New York for twenty-seven years before 
his appointment to the C.C.P.A.  Along with Patent Office Examiner-in-Chief 
Pasquale J. Federico, Rich drafted what was later enacted as the Patent Act of 1952, 
the most significant revision of U.S. patent law since 1836.  See Judge Giles Sutherland 
Rich, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 305, 305-06 (1994) (detailing Judge Rich’s 
role in the drafting of the 1952 Patent Act).  Rich was awarded the Jefferson Medal of 
the New Jersey Patent Law Association, the Charles F. Kettering Award and 
Distinguished Government Service Award from George Washington University and 
the Harlan Fisk Stone Medal from Columbia University.  The American Intellectual 
Property Law Association’s annual patent moot court competition is named after 
him, as is an Inn of Court located in Washington, D.C.  In addition, Judge Rich was 
awarded honorary Doctor of Laws degrees from George Washington University, the 
John Marshall Law School, and George Mason University. 
 2. Rich assumed office as an associate judge of the C.C.P.A. on July 20, 1956.  
The C.C.P.A. had jurisdiction over, inter alia, appeals from the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (“PTO”) with respect to patent applications and interferences and 
applications for registration of marks.  The court, which consisted of five judges, 
heard each case en banc.  With the merger of the C.C.P.A. with the U.S. Court of 
Claims on October 1, 1982, Judge Rich became an associate judge on the newly 
created U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit has 
jurisdiction over, inter alia, appeals from the PTO with respect to both patent 
applications and interferences, and applications for registration of marks, and over 
appeals from the federal district courts in patent infringement suits.  See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1295 (2006).  The Federal Circuit, which, at full complement, consists of twelve 
judges (see 28 U.S.C. § 44), generally sits in three-judge panels.  See 28 U.S.C. § 46(b) 
and § 46(c).  Judge Rich served on the Federal Circuit until his death in 1999.  By the 
time of his death, he had become the oldest living federal judge.  Judge Rich never 
took senior status.  A special session of the Federal Circuit was held on September 27, 
1999, to commemorate his life and career.  The then chief judge of the court, the 
Honorable H. Robert Mayer, commented at that time that, “[t]he law has lost a 
legend, the court has lost an institution, and we all have lost a friend.  But what a 
wonderful long life he had.”  See The Third Branch, “Oldest Active Federal Judge 
Dies,” http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/jul99ttb/oldest.html. 
 3. During his tenure on the bench, Judge Rich authored many landmark patent 
law decisions.  See, e.g., In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 201 U.S.P.Q. 352 (C.C.P.A. 1979), 
aff’d sub nom. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (holding that a human-
made microorganism is patentable subject matter); In re Diehr, 602 F.2d 982, 203 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 44 (C.C.P.A. 1979), aff’d sub nom. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 
(1981) (holding that a process for curing synthetic rubber employing mathematical 
formula and programmable digital computer is patentable subject matter); State St. 
Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1596 
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that a method of doing business is patentable subject 
matter); In re Donaldson, 16 F.3d 1189, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1845 (Fed. Cir. 1994) 
(holding that 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 6, applies during ex parte prosecution); In re 
Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc) 
(holding that data, transformed by machine through mathematical equations to 
produce smooth waveform display on rasterizer monitor, constituted practical 
application of abstract idea because it produced “useful, concrete and tangible 
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is that Judge Rich also authored many significant decisions in the 
area of trademark law. Judge Rich’s opinions in the area of 
trademarks span the spectrum of trademark registrability issues and 
explore important issues of public policy. 
This Article reviews a number of Judge Rich’s most important 
trademark and intellectual property decisions.4  These decisions focus 
on such issues as the impact of consents, functionality, trademark 
subject matter, and genericness.  Such a review leads to the 
observation that the vast majority of his opinions and views remain 
relevant, indeed, controlling, in resolving trademark registration 
disputes. 
I. THE ROLE OF THE PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE IN PROTECTING 
THE PUBLIC INTEREST:  THE IMPACT OF CONSENTS 
As part of its statutory responsibilities, the Patent and Trademark 
Office (“PTO”)5 may refuse registration of a mark under Section 2(d) 
of the Federal Trademark (“Lanham”) Act upon a finding that such 
mark so resembles a previously registered or used mark as to be likely 
to cause confusion.6  One avenue open to an applicant confronted 
with such a refusal is to obtain the consent of the owner of the 
                                                          
result”); In re Bass, 474 F.2d 1276, 177 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 178 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (holding 
that 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) makes available as “prior art” under 35 U.S.C. § 103 prior 
invention of another who has not “abandoned,  suppressed or concealed” 
invention); In re Hilmer, 424 F.2d 1108, 165 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 155 (C.C.P.A. 1970) 
(holding that the limitation of 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) to prior inventions made “in this 
country” is not removed by 35 U.S.C. § 119, which provides that application for U.S. 
patent could be given a date prior to when the application was filed in foreign 
country); see also A. Samuel Oddi, Assault on the Citadel:  Judge Rich and Computer-
Related Inventions, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 1033 (2002-03) (reviewing Judge Rich’s patent law 
decisions related to computer technology). 
 4. A search of the LEXIS database conducted in January 2004 revealed a total of 
174 trademark–related decisions, including concurring and dissenting opinions, 
authored by Judge Rich.  We wish to thank former research assistant, Justin 
Greenfelder, for help in compiling the cases and current research assistant, Kevin 
Quinn, for assistance. 
 5. The acronym “PTO” is used as a shorthand reference to the Trademark 
Operations of the United States Patent and Trademark Office.  It was not until 1975 
that the term “Trademark” was incorporated in the name of the agency responsible 
for examining applications for federal registration of marks.  Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. 
L. No. 93-596, § 1, 88 Stat. 1949.  Prior to that time, the agency was known simply as 
the “Patent Office.” 
 6. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) provides that a mark shall be refused registration if it: 
so resembles a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office, or a 
mark or trade name previously used in the United States by another and not 
abandoned, as to be likely, when used on or in connection with the goods of 
the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive . . . . 
In fact, the PTO does not refuse registration based on a previously used mark unless 
such mark is the subject of a federal registration.  See TRADEMARK MANUAL OF 
EXAMINING PROCEDURES, § 1207.03, MARKS PREVIOUSLY USED IN UNITED STATES BUT 
NOT REGISTERED (4th ed. 2005). 
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previously registered mark to the registration and use of the mark by 
the applicant.  Judge Rich’s opinions reflect the view that such 
consents should be respected.  However, until the recent past, the 
PTO and the courts have been reluctant to accord such consents 
much weight, if any at all.  For example, in In re Laskin Brothers, Inc.,7 a 
case decided under the 1905 Trademark Act, the C.C.P.A. stated that 
“the Commissioner of Patents acts as the guardian of the public 
interests and the parties by their deeds or agreement cannot confer 
upon him the power to do that which he is prohibited from doing 
under the statute.”8  During his tenure on the bench, Judge Rich 
played a leading role in effecting a reassessment of this view to reflect 
the realities of the marketplace.  A review of his opinions on this issue 
reveals his deep understanding of the underpinnings of both U.S. 
trademark law9 and the role of the PTO. 
Judge Rich first explored the premise that the PTO should serve as 
the guardian of the public interest in his concurring opinion10 in In re 
National Distillers and Chemical Corp.11  In that case, the Examiner of 
Trademarks refused registration of the mark MERITO for rum under 
Section 2(d) of the Lanham Act in view of a registration for 
MARQUES DEL MERITO for wines, despite the existence of a 
consent to use and register by the owner of the cited registration.12  In 
reversing the decision of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board,13 
the C.C.P.A. determined that its earlier decision in Laskin was not 
controlling since it was issued prior to enactment of the Lanham 
                                                          
 7. 146 F.2d 308, 64 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 225 (C.C.P.A. 1944). 
 8. Id. at 309, 64 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 226.  Laskin cited the decision of the 
Commissioner of Patents in George A. Breon and Co., Inc. v. Aronovic, 33 U.S.P.Q. 390, 
391 (Dec. Comm’r. Pat. 1937), where it was held  that “the interests of the public 
may not be ignored; and when it appears that the goods are so nearly related that 
their sale under identical trade marks would be likely to confuse the public or to 
deceive purchasers, registration must be denied notwithstanding the owner’s 
consent.” 
 9. A fundamental principle of U.S. trademark law is that rights are based on 
priority of use, as opposed to registration.  See, e.g., In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 
82 (1879).  This principle animates a number of Judge Rich’s opinions dealing with 
consent agreements and the role of the Trademark Office. 
 10. The principal opinion was authored by Judge Arthur Smith, a former patent 
law professor at the University of Michigan.  Judge Rich once commented that, 
beginning with Judge Smith’s appointment, “for quite a long time, in many instances 
which show up in the reports here and there, one would see Rich and Smith versus 
the others.”  See Interview with Judge Giles S. Rich, 9 FED. CIR. B.J. 55, 61 (1999-2000). 
 11. 297 F.2d 941, 132 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 271 (C.C.P.A. 1962). 
 12. The consent agreement provided, among other things, that the registrant 
would not sell in the United States rum bearing the mark MERITO.  The facts of the 
case demonstrated that the applicant owned the cited registration until a few weeks 
after the application was filed and had sold MERITO rum for over twenty years. 
 13. 125 U.S.P.Q. 197 (T.T.A.B. 1960). 
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Act,14 which, according to the court, liberalized the prior 1905 Act.  In 
his concurring opinion, Judge Rich focused on the argument that the 
PTO acts as the guardian of the public interest in examining 
applications for registration of marks and that, as such, has the 
responsibility to exercise independent judgment on the issue of 
likelihood of confusion.  He disagreed with that rationale, noting: 
The refusal of registration, except as it is an aspect of protecting 
existing marks (or the protection of the freedom of the public to 
use words and symbols in the public domain), does not serve to 
protect the public from confusion because refusal to register has 
almost no effect on trademark use, which use always precedes 
application to register,15 continues during the prosecution of the 
application, and usually goes on after registration is finally refused, 
unless something other than that refusal intervenes to stop such 
use. . . .16 
In Judge Rich’s view: 
The public is confused only by what is done in the marketplace, by 
real life activity . . . . The denial of a registration has little or no 
effect on such activity.  Its denial affords, therefore, little or no 
protection to the purchasing public.  On the other hand, the 
granting of a registration may protect the public from confusion.17 
This is so, Judge Rich explained, because armed with a registration, 
the registrant would be in a better position to halt infringing 
conduct. 
According to Judge Rich, the primary purpose of Section 2(d) is to 
protect the owners of prior marks.  In carrying out this purpose, he 
explained, it follows as a secondary effect that the public is protected 
from confusion.18 The clause “confusion or mistake or to deceive 
                                                          
 14. Act of July 5, 1946, Pub. L. 79-489, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427. 
 15. Prior to November 16, 1989, the effective date of the Trademark Law 
Revision Act of 1988 (Act of Nov. 16, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935), U.S. 
trademark owners had to use their mark in commerce before being eligible to file an 
application to register such mark.  As of November 16, 1989, U.S. trademark owners 
may seek registration based solely on a bona fide intention to use the mark in 
commerce, although use is still required before a registration may issue.  See 15 
U.S.C. § 1051(b)(1) and (d). 
 16. 297 F.2d at 948, 132 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 277. 
 17. Id. at 949, 132 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 278. 
 18. In support of this proposition, Judge Rich referred to a paper presented by 
Professor Walter J. Derenberg in which Derenberg argued that: 
For the purpose of registration proceedings the private interests of the 
previous registrant are primarily involved and that the public interest in such 
situations is not sufficiently predominant to compel the Office to reject the 
application in its capacity as guardian of the public interest and irrespective 
of the previous registrant’s own attitude. 
See Walter J. Derenberg, The Patent Office as Guardian of the Public Interest in Trade-Mark 
Registration Proceedings,  31 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y, 647, 674-75 (1949). 
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purchasers” in Section 2(d), Judge Rich argued, must be construed 
by a rule of reason to include only such acts as will injure someone. 
“Otherwise it prevents registration to no purpose.”19 
The continued viability of National Distillers was placed in doubt by 
the C.C.P.A.’s decision six years later in In re Continental Baking Co.20  
In that case, the court,21 in refusing to give effect to a consent 
agreement from the owner of the cited registration, stated: 
Congress clearly charged the Patent Office with the initial 
responsibility of determining whether certain trademarks are 
entitled to registration, as distinguished from use . . . .  To hold 
that the present consent to register should control would be to 
allow individuals to take the law in their own hands, thus usurping 
the responsibility that Congress has placed in the Patent Office.  
Should there be any language in National Distillers intimating that 
individuals have such rights regarding registration of trademarks, 
then to that extent that decision is hereby expressly overruled.22 
Soon, thereafter, the court, in In re Avedis Zildjian Co.,23 concluded 
over a dissent by Judge Rich that “the interests of the public may not 
be ignored; and when it appears that the goods are so nearly related 
that their sales under identical trade marks would be likely to confuse 
the public or to deceive purchasers, registration must be denied 
notwithstanding the owner’s consent.”24  Zildjian was followed by the 
decision in Ultra-White Co., Inc. v. Johnson Chemical Industries, Inc.,25 
where the C.C.P.A. refused to apply the equitable defenses of laches, 
estoppel and acquiescence where likelihood of confusion was not 
reasonably in doubt.  In his dissent, Judge Rich reiterated his view 
that the trademark register should reflect the realities of the 
marketplace.  According to Judge Rich: 
I cannot understand what the majority thinks is accomplished by 
preventing or canceling the registration of a mark which will 
continue in use.  The lack of registration will have no effect on 
public confusion, one way or the other, but it will disadvantage the 
owner of the unregistered mark in asserting his substantive rights 
(which he still has, regardless of the lack of registration) against 
third parties, and it will detract from the usefulness of the register 
                                                          
 19. 297 F.2d at 952, 132 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 280. 
 20. 390 F.2d 747, 156 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 514 (C.C.P.A. 1968).  Continental Baking 
was authored by Chief Judge Worley, the lone dissenter in National Distillers. 
 21. Judge Rich and Judge Smith dissented from the court’s decision. 
 22. Continental Baking, 390 F.2d at 749, 156 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 516. 
 23. 394 F.2d 860, 157 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 517 (C.C.P.A. 1968). 
 24. Id. at 862, 157 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 519. 
 25. 465 F.2d 891, 175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 166 (C.C.P.A. 1972). 
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as a convenient means for determining what marks are actually in 
use without being in derogation of anyone’s rights.26 
Judge Rich’s views on the role of consents in assessing how best to 
advance the public interest finally gained acceptance in a series of 
decisions issued after creation of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit in October 1982.  The first such case, In re N.A.D. 
Inc.,27 involved an application to register the mark NARKOMED for 
anesthesia machines.  The examiner refused registration in view of 
registrations for NARCO MEDICAL SERVICES for rental and leasing 
of hospital surgical equipment and NARCO and DESIGN for 
specialized medical equipment, including machines for 
administering anesthesia.  The owner of the cited registrations 
consented to applicant’s registration and use of NARKOMED.  In 
upholding the refusal to register, the Trademark Trial and Appeal 
Board refused to give any weight to the consent, noting that there is 
no doubt that a likelihood of confusion exists and the consent did 
not specify how confusion could be avoided. 
Writing for the court, Judge Rich first took issue with the Board’s 
“requirement” that, to be persuasive, the consent must show that the 
goods are different and that the parties’ marketing channels will not 
overlap.  He noted that “[c]onsents come in different forms and 
under circumstances in infinite variety” and are “but one factor to be 
taken into account with all of the other relevant circumstances 
bearing on the likelihood of confusion referred to in § 2(d).”28  In 
this case, Judge Rich explained, the consent, having been given by a 
competitor well acquainted with the realities of the marketplace, 
                                                          
 26. Id. at 894-95, 175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 168 (emphasis in original).  This theme 
permeated a number of other decisions authored by Judge Rich arising in contexts 
other than the applicability of consent agreements.  See, e.g., In re The Int’l Nickel 
Co., Inc., 282 F.2d 952, 127 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 331 (C.C.P.A. 1960) (Rich, J., 
dissenting) (contending that the cancellation of the registration of NI-TENSYL 
under Section 8 of the Lanham Act on grounds of non-use, where the evidence 
showed current use of NI-TENSYLIRON, defeated the basic purposes of the Lanham 
Act, which are to provide better protection to trademark owners and to make the 
registration system of greater use to the public); see also Glenwood Labs., Inc. v. Am. 
Home Prods. Corp., 455 F.2d 1384, 173 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 19 (C.C.P.A. 1972) (Rich, J., 
dissenting) (criticizing the majority for adopting a “greater care doctrine” in finding 
a likelihood of confusion between two marks used on drugs). 
I ask the majority and I ask the board how they think their decisions are 
going to “avoid confusion or mistake in the dispensing of pharmaceuticals.”  
We are here involved in adjudicating a right to register a trademark in the 
Patent Office and do not have the slightest concern with dispensing 
pharmaceuticals or anything connected therewith, such as labeling, 
advertising, or the like. 
Id. at 1389, 173 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 23. 
 27. 754 F.2d 996, 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 969 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
 28. Id. at 999, 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 971. 
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together with the other facts,29 supports reversal of the Board’s 
decision.  Quoting from the C.C.P.A.’s decision in In re E.I. DuPont de 
Nemours & Co.,30 Judge Rich observed that “[a] mere assumption that 
confusion is likely will rarely prevail against uncontroverted evidence 
from those on the firing line that it is not.”31 
Two years after N.A.D. was decided, the court, per Judge Rich, once 
again took the Board to task for failing to give effect to the parties’ 
consent agreement.32  Judge Rich emphasized that the public interest 
is best served by registering as many marks as possible that are in use 
so that they are available for search purposes.  Section 2(d), Judge 
Rich noted, should be construed in pari materia with the rest of the 
Lanham Act and the policies that animate the Act.33  “Those policies 
were not served by the independent, misguided efforts of the board 
to take it upon itself to prove facts . . . to establish a case of likelihood 
of confusion when not asked to do so.”34 
Judge Rich’s last decision on the role of the PTO in protecting the 
public interest and the impact of a consent involved a refusal to 
register FOUR SEASONS BILTMORE for resort innkeeping services 
in view of a registration for THE BILTMORE LOS ANGELES for 
hotel services.35  The parties entered into a consent agreement that 
limited applicant’s use of the term BILTMORE and the registrant’s 
use of the term FOUR SEASONS and both parties agreed to 
cooperate and find ways to eliminate or minimize confusion in the 
event any arose. 
In reversing the refusal to register, the court commented as 
follows: 
Believing that its role in enforcing Section 2(d) of the Lanham Act 
is to second-guess the conclusions of those most familiar with the 
marketplace, the PTO “is, at times, like a cat watching the wrong 
                                                          
 29. Such other facts included the sophistication of the relevant purchasing 
public and the cost of the applicant’s goods. 
 30. 476 F.2d 1357, 177 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973).  In DuPont, Chief 
Judge Markey, writing for the court, explained that “a naked ‘consent’ may carry 
little weight,” while “the weight to be given more detailed agreements . . . should be 
substantial.”  Id. at 1362, 177 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 568. 
 31. Id. at 1363, 177 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 568. 
 32. See Bongrain Int’l (Am.) Corp. v. Delice de France, Inc., 811 F.2d 1479, 1 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1775 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
 33. Judge Rich observed that the primary purpose of the Lanham Act is to add 
federal procedural rights to the common law rights of trademark owners.  These 
procedural rights include prima facie evidence of the validity of the registered mark, 
of the registrant’s ownership of the mark, and of the registrant’s exclusive right to 
use the mark in commerce.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b). 
 34. Bongrain, 811 F.2d at 1485, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1779. 
 35. In re Four Seasons Hotels Ltd., 987 F.2d 1565, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1071 
(Fed. Cir. 1993). 
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rat hole.”  The role of the PTO is not, in “deny[ing] registration if 
it feels there is, by its independent determination, any likelihood of 
confusion of any kind as between the mark sought to be registered 
and the prior registration, without regard to the desires, opinions 
or agreements of the owner the prior registration . . .”  In re Nat’l 
Distillers & Chem. Corp., 297 F.2d 941, 948, 132 U.S.P.Q. 271, 277 
(C.C.P.A. 1962)(Rich, J., concurring).  Rather, the PTO’s role is to 
protect owners of trademarks by allowing them to register their 
marks.  Denial of registration does not deny the owner of the right 
to use the mark, and thus, will not serve to protect the public from 
confusion.  “No government could police trademark use so as to 
protect the public from confusion.  It must count on the self-
interest of trademark owners to do that.”  297 F.2d at 950-51, 132 
USPQ at 279.36 
Judge Rich’s views on the effect of consent agreements represent 
current PTO practice.  Examiners are now directed to give “great 
weight” to a proper consent agreement and not to interpose their 
views on the issue of likelihood of confusion where there exists a 
“credible” consent agreement and, on balance, the other factors do 
not support a finding of likelihood of confusion.37  The Trademark 
Trial and Appeal Board appears to have gotten the message as well.38 
II.  FUNCTIONALITY 
Few, if any, issues of trademark law have evoked as much 
controversy as the doctrine of functionality.  At its core, the 
functionality doctrine serves the important public purpose of 
preventing trademark law from being used for anticompetitive 
purposes.39  While the purpose of the functionality doctrine may be 
                                                          
 36. Id. at 1566, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1071-72. 
 37. See TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURES, § 1207.01(d)(viii), 
CONSENT AGREEMENTS (4th ed. 2005). 
 38. See, e.g., In re Leiner Health Servs. Corp., 2004 TTAB LEXIS 508 (T.T.A.B. 
Sept. 9, 2004); In re Sunshine Distribution Inc., 2003 TTAB LEXIS 576 (T.T.A.B. 
Dec. 9, 2003); In re Masco Corp. of Indiana, 2002 TTAB LEXIS 288 (T.T.A.B. May 14, 
2002). 
 39. The Supreme Court of the United States, in Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods.Co., 
Inc., stated that: 
The functionality doctrine prevents trademark law, which seeks to promote 
competition by protecting a firm’s reputation, from instead inhibiting 
legitimate competition by allowing a producer to control a useful product 
feature.  It is the province of patent law, not trademark law, to encourage 
invention by granting inventors a monopoly over new product designs or 
functions for a limited time . . . after which competitors are free to use the 
innovation. 
514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995).  The doctrine of functionality has two branches—
utilitarian functionality and aesthetic functionality.  Utilitarian functionality focuses 
on whether the design in issue makes the product work better; aesthetic functionality 
focuses on whether the design makes the product more attractive from the 
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simply explained, its application has proven difficult.  In a series of 
decisions, Judge Rich sought to shed light on this issue. 
In two decisions issued on the same day—In re Deister Concentrator 
Co., Inc.40 and In re Shakespeare Co.41—Judge Rich explained the 
rationale for denying trademark protection to functional matter.  
Judge Rich began his opinion in Deister by emphasizing that affording 
trademark protection to functional or utilitarian designs would 
conflict with patent law and policy, to the extent patent law imposes a 
number of specific patentability requirements42 and limits the term of 
protection.43  “To give appellant the trademark registration it asks for 
here would give it a potential perpetual monopoly on the outline 
shape of its shaking table deck,”44 Judge Rich declared.  He noted 
that socioeconomic policy encourages competition by all fair means, 
including the right to copy, except where copying is lawfully 
prevented by patent or copyright.  Judge Rich emphasized that this 
right to copy is applicable even where the design in issue is distinctive 
and even where copying gives rise to consumer confusion.  As 
explained by Judge Rich, “[p]ublic acceptance of a functional feature 
                                                          
standpoint of appearance.  While functional designs have long been refused 
registration, it was not until 1998 that Congress amended the Lanham Act to provide 
a specific statutory basis—15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(5)—to refuse to register a mark that 
“comprises any matter that, as a whole, is functional.”  See Trademark Law Treaty 
Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 105-330, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1998) (formally 
implementing the aforementioned amendment and others). 
 40. 289 F.2d 496, 129 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 314 (C.C.P.A. 1961).  Deister involved an 
application to register the rhomboidal design of a coal cleaning table.  While there 
was evidence that such design was recognized by the trade as applicant’s goods, the 
application was refused on grounds of functionality.  The examiner noted that the 
rhomboidal design was selected to increase production and efficiency of the 
applicant’s coal cleaning tables.  The Trademark Trial and Board affirmed the 
refusal to register. 
 41. 289 F.2d 506, 129 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 323 (C.C.P.A. 1961).  Shakespeare involved 
an application to register a continuous spiral marking formed in relief on the surface 
of and extending for substantially one full length of a fishing rod.  The evidence 
established that the marking was the result of the practice of a patented process.  In 
upholding the refusal to register, the C.C.P.A. cited Deister and noted that: 
Were the spiral marking to be treated as a trademark the holder of the 
trademark rights would have a potentially perpetual monopoly which would 
enable it either to prevent others from using the process which results in the 
mark or force them to go to the trouble and expense of removing it. 
Id. at 508, 129 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 325. 
 42. Under the patent statute, an invention may not be patented if it does not 
consist of patentable subject matter, is not novel, is obvious, or does not meet the 
written description, enablement, or best mode requirements.  See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 
102, 103, and 112 (providing the basic requirements for and conditions of obtaining 
a patent). 
 43. Under 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2), the term of a patent, in general, begins on the 
date of issuance and ends twenty years from the date on which the application was 
filed. 
 44. Deister, 289 F.2d at 499, 129 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 318. 
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as an indication of source is . . . not determinative of right to register.  
Preservation of freedom to copy ‘functional’ features is the 
determining factor.”45 
Upon review of the evidence, the court concluded that the design 
in issue was functional because it provided for a number of 
engineering efficiencies, including saving of floor space.  The court 
emphasized that it was not denying registration merely because the 
design possessed utility but, rather, because the shape was, “in 
essence,” utilitarian.46 
The principles set forth above were summarized by Judge Rich in 
Deister through reference to what he referred to in his opinion as 
trademark “truisms”: 
(1) Trademarks enable one to determine the existence of common 
source; but not everything that enables one to determine source is 
a trademark. 
(2) A trademark distinguishes one man’s goods from the goods of 
others; but not everything that enables goods to be so distinguished 
will be protected as a trademark. 
(3) Some trademarks are words or configurations that are 
protected because they have acquired a “secondary meaning”; but 
not every word or configuration that has a de facto “secondary 
meaning” is protected as a trademark. 
(4) A feature dictated solely by “functional” (utilitarian) 
considerations may not be protected as a trademark; but mere 
possession of a function (utility) is not sufficient reason to deny 
protection.47 
Writing for the majority several years later in Best Lock Corp. v. 
Schlage Lock Co.,48 Judge Rich amplified on the fourth truism.  He 
noted that such truism reflects the obvious fact that some articles, 
made in a purely arbitrary configuration (e.g., the shape of a bottle of 
COCA-COLA®), may perform a function, which could equally well 
be served by other shapes, and in such circumstances the incidental 
function should not by itself preclude trademark protection.  On the 
other hand, where the configuration in issue provides a functional 
advantage, such configuration is not registrable as a mark. “The 
reason is clear.  If a configuration is functional in that sense, then 
everyone has the right to use the configuration for its functional 
                                                          
 45. Id. at 504, 129 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 322. 
 46. Id. at 506, 129 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 323. 
 47. Id. at 502, 129 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 320. 
 48. 413 F.2d 1195, 162 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 552 (C.C.P.A. 1969). 
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purpose, subject only to such exclusive right for a limited time as may 
exist under the patent laws.”49 
Judge Rich, in Best Lock, also discussed the weight to be accorded to 
the existence of a utility patent that discloses the configuration in 
issue.  Judge Rich noted that the court, in In re Shenango,50 held that a 
utility patent is only “some evidence” as to functionality, recognizing 
that a patent may not be evidence of functionality in regard to things 
of a purely “arbitrary” or “mere design” nature that happen to be 
disclosed in the patent but that are not attributed to any functional 
significance therein.51 
In his concurring opinion in In re Mogen David Wine Corp.,52 in 
which the court reversed53 the refusal to register the shape of a 
decanter bottle, Judge Rich further amplified on the policy 
justifications for the functionality doctrine and distinguished the 
                                                          
 49. Id. at 1199, 162 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 555. 
 50. 362 F.2d 287, 150 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 115 (C.C.P.A. 1966). 
 51. Id. at 292, 150 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 119.  Thirty-five years later, the Supreme 
Court of the United States essentially agreed.  In TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing 
Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001), the Court held: 
A utility patent is strong evidence that the features therein claimed are 
functional.  If trade dress protection is sought for those features the strong 
evidence of functionality based on the previous patent adds great weight to 
the statutory presumption that features are deemed functional until proved 
otherwise by the party seeking trade dress protection.  Where the expired 
patent claimed the features in question, one who seeks to establish trade 
dress protection must carry the heavy burden of showing that the feature is 
not functional, for instance, by showing that it is merely an ornamental, 
incidental, or arbitrary aspect of the device. 
Under 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (a)(3), in a civil action for trade dress infringement for trade 
dress that is not the subject of a federal registration, the person who asserts trade 
dress protection has the burden of establishing that the trade dress is not functional.  
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2006). 
 52. 328 F.2d 925, 140 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 575 (C.C.P.A. 1964). 
 53. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, noting that the applied-for design 
was the subject of a design patent, held, as a matter of law, that the design was not 
eligible for registration on the Principal Register.  In reversing, the C.C.P.A. held 
that “registration as a design and registration as a trademark are not mutually 
exclusive, and it is not a fatal objection to an application to register something that is 
claimed as a trademark that the subject matter of the application is capable of being 
registered as a design.”  328 F.2d at 929, 140 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 578.  Accord In re 
Honeywell, Inc., 497 F.2d 1344, 1348, 181 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 821 (C.C.P.A. 1974) 
(Rich, J., concurring).  According to the majority: 
Federal design patent laws were created to encourage the invention of 
ornamental designs. Federal trademark laws, which are independent in 
origin from the design patent laws, seek to prevent the public from 
encountering confusion, mistake, and deception in the purchase of goods 
and services and to protect the integrity of the trademark owner’s product 
identity.  With that distinction in mind, this court decided that the public 
interest . . . must prevail over any alleged extension of design patent rights, 
when a trademark is non-functional and does in fact serve as a means to 
distinguish the goods of the trademark owner from those of others. 
497 F.2d at 1348, 181 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 824. 
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instant case from Deister.  He contended that the crux of the matter in 
determining whether or not a product design or configuration is or is 
not functional is whether competition would in fact be hindered.  If 
so, then the design is functional and unprotectable under trademark 
law.  If not, then the design is nonfunctional and may be subject to 
trademark protection.54  In responding to the Solicitor’s argument 
that the existence of a design patent is evidence of ornamental 
function, Judge Rich noted that “even if we assume some value 
behind the specific design in an aesthetic sense, it is not in the least 
essential to use it in order to have a fully functioning bottle or an 
attractive bottle . . . .”55  In contrast, Judge Rich observed that in 
Deister, use of the shape was essential to the enjoyment of the 
engineering advantages realized through the use of the shape.56 
Judge Rich’s decision for the court in In re Morton-Norwich Products, 
Inc.,57 is a frequently cited58 opinion on the issue of functionality.  The 
case involved an appeal from a refusal to register the configuration of 
a container.  After reiterating that the genesis of the functionality 
doctrine is the right to compete through imitation of a competitor’s 
product, Judge Rich noted that an exception to such a right to copy 
exists where the design is nonfunctional and distinctive, even though 
such design is not protected by patent or copyright law.  “Thus, when 
a design is ‘nonfunctional,’ the right to compete through imitation 
gives way, presumably upon balance of that right with the originator’s 
right to prevent others from infringing upon an established symbol of 
trade identification.”59 
Judge Rich then elaborated upon his earlier-stated distinction 
between designs that have utility and designs that are utilitarian; the 
former of which may be the subject of trademark protection and the 
latter of which may not.60  Judge Rich coined the term “de facto 
                                                          
 54. It “may be” subject to trademark protection because the design or 
configuration must be distinctive in order to be eligible for trademark protection.  In 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000), the Supreme Court 
held that a product’s design is protectable under the trademark law only if it has 
acquired distinctiveness or secondary meaning. 
 55. Mogen David, 328 F.2d at 933, 140 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 582. 
 56. 289 F.2d at 498, 129 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 317. 
 57. 671 F.2d 1332, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 9 (C.C.P.A. 1982). 
 58. As of February 2007, Morton-Norwich Products was cited positively nearly 100 
times in subsequent cases. 
 59. Morton-Norwich Prods., 671 F.2d at 1337, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 12. 
 60. Judge Rich noted that some early C.C.P.A. cases, including In re Dennison 
Mfg. Co., 39 F.2d 720, 5 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 316 (C.C.P.A. 1930), held that a 
configuration that possessed utility is not the subject of trademark protection.  This 
broad statement of the law, Judge Rich declared, “is incorrect and inconsistent with 
later pronouncements.”  Morton-Norwich Prods., 671 F.2d at 1338, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 
at 13. 
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functionality” to refer to those designs that perform a function, i.e., 
possess utility, and the term “de jure functionality” to refer to those 
designs that are utilitarian. He then clarified that in determining 
whether a design is functional, the inquiry must focus on the design 
of the thing under consideration and not the thing itself,61 as well as 
the degree of design utility.  In sum, Judge Rich declared, 
“‘utilitarian’ means ‘superior in function (de facto) or economy of 
manufacture,’ which ‘superiority’ is determined in light of 
competitive necessity to copy.”62 
Morton-Norwich is most often cited for Judge Rich’s articulation of 
the factors relevant to a determination of functionality.  According to 
Judge Rich, in determining whether a particular design is “superior,” 
courts may focus on:  (1) the existence of an expired utility patent 
that discloses the utilitarian advantage of the design sought to be 
protected, (2) whether the owner of the design touts its utilitarian 
advantages in advertising, (3) the existence of other alternatives to 
the design in issue, and (4) whether the design results from a 
comparatively simple or cheap method of manufacture.63 
While Judge Rich’s decision in Morton-Norwich has been cited 
approvingly and followed by a number of federal courts of appeals,64 
                                                          
 61. Id. at 1338-39, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 13. Judge Rich characterized this 
principle as the first addition to the Deister truisms. 
 62. Id. at 1339, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 14. 
 63. Id. at 1340-41, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 15-16.  Upon review of the evidence, 
the court concluded that the design was not dictated by the functions to be 
performed and that the design did not result in a functionally or economically 
superior container; thus, the refusal to register on grounds of functionality was 
reversed.  The case was remanded for consideration of the issue of whether the 
design was either inherently distinctive or had acquired distinctiveness.  Judge Rich 
noted that a nondistinctive design does not necessarily equal a “functional” design 
and labeled this proposition the second addition to the Deister truisms.  In In re R.M. 
Smith, Inc., 734 F.2d 1482, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1 (Fed. Cir. 1984), Judge Rich held 
that the fact that a design was the subject of a design patent, while some evidence of 
nonfunctionality, does not, without more, establish distinctiveness or recognition as a 
trademark. 
 64. See, e.g., Sunbeam Prods. v. W. Bend Co., 123 F.3d 246, 255, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1161, 1168 (5th Cir. 1997) (“[T]his court has adopted the ‘utilitarian’ 
standard of functionality, which focuses on the protection of competition.”); 
Merchant & Evans, Inc. v. Roosevelt Bldg. Prods. Co., 963 F.2d 628, 633, 22 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1730, 1733 (3d Cir. 1992) (“The rationale for the functionality 
limitation on trade dress protection ‘has its genesis in the judicial theory that there 
exists a fundamental right to compete through imitation of a competitor’s product, 
which right can only be temporarily denied by the patent or copyright laws.’”); Clamp 
Mfg. Co. v. Enco Mfg. Co., 870 F.2d 512, 516, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1226, 1229 (9th 
Cir. 1989) (“The requirement of functionality is based ‘on the judicial theory that 
there exists a fundamental right to compete through imitation of a competitor’s 
product, which right can only be temporarily denied by the patent or copyright 
laws.’”); Stormy Clime Ltd. v. Progroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971, 977, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
2026, 2026 (2d Cir. 1987) (the functionality inquiry “should have focused on 
whether bestowing trade dress protection upon [a particular] arrangement of 
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the Supreme Court’s decision in TrafFix casts doubt on the role of 
competitive need or necessity in the functionality analysis, at least in 
cases before the federal district courts.65 
                                                          
features ‘will hinder competition or impinge upon the rights of others to compete 
effectively in the sale of goods’”); W.T. Rogers v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 339, 228 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 145, 147 (7th Cir. 1985) (“Ornamental, fanciful shapes and 
patterns are not in short supply, so appropriating one of them to serve as an 
identifying mark does not take away from any competitor something that he needs in 
order to make a competing brand.  But if the feature is not ornamental or fanciful or 
whimsical or arbitrary, but is somehow intrinsic to the entire product consisting of 
the manufacturer’s brand and his rivals’ brands, the protection will be denied.  The 
name of this principle is ‘functionality’, on which see, e.g. In re Morton-Norwich . . .”). 
 65. The Supreme Court, in its decision in TrafFix, supra note 51 and 
accompanying text, held that whether a particular design is a competitive necessity 
does not represent a comprehensive definition of functionality.  The Court referred 
to its earlier decision in Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 
(1982), in which it held that, “‘[i]n general terms, a product feature is functional,’ 
and cannot serve as a trademark, ‘if it is essential to the use or purpose of the article 
or if it affects the cost or quality of the article.’”  TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 32.  According to 
the Court in TrafFix, “[w]here the design is functional under the Inwood formulation 
there is no need to proceed further to consider if there is a competitive necessity for 
the feature.”  However, the Court also held that it is proper to inquire into 
competitive necessity in cases of aesthetic, as opposed to utilitarian, functionality. See 
Mark Alan Thurmon, The Rise and Fall of Trademark Law’s Functionality Doctrine, 56 
FLA. L. REV. 243 (2004) (criticizing the Court for abandoning the competitive need 
test).  However, in Valu-Engineering Inc. v. Rexnord Corp., the first post-TrafFix case 
decided by the Federal Circuit, the court held that: 
We do not understand the Supreme Court’s decision in TrafFix to have 
altered the Morton-Norwich analysis . . . [T]he Morton-Norwich factors aid in 
the determination of whether a particular feature is functional, and the third 
factor focuses on the availability of “other alternatives” . . . .  We did not in 
the past under the third factor require that the opposing party establish that 
there was a “competitive necessity” for the product feature.  Nothing in 
TrafFix suggests that consideration of alternative designs is not properly part 
of the overall mix, and we do not read the Court’s observations in TrafFix as 
rendering the availability of alternative designs irrelevant.  Rather, we 
conclude that the Court merely noted that once a product feature is found 
functional based on other considerations there is no need to consider the 
availability of alternative designs, because the feature cannot be given trade 
dress protection merely because there are alternative designs available.  But 
that does not mean that the availability of alternative designs cannot be a 
legitimate source of evidence to determine whether a feature is functional in 
the first place. 
278 F.3d 1268, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2002).  The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board also 
continues to follow and apply Morton-Norwich.  See, e.g., In re N.V. Organon, 79 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1639 (T.T.A.B. 2006) (“The Morton-Norwich factors provide a 
framework with which to evaluate the evidence relating to functionality.”); In re Bose 
Corp., 2005 TTAB LEXIS 293 (T.T.A.B. 2005) (“For more than two decades, this 
Board and our reviewing Court have applied the ‘Morton-Norwich’ factors when 
determining whether a particular product design is functional.”); In re Backflow 
Prevention Device Inspections, Inc., 2004 TTAB LEXIS 539 (T.T.A.B. 2004) (after 
citing TrafFix, the Board applied the Morton-Norwich factors). 
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III. TRADEMARK SUBJECT MATTER 
Writing for the C.C.P.A. in In re Cooper,66 Judge Rich held that the 
title of a single book cannot be a trademark, even if the mark consists 
of a coined term, in this case, TEENY-BIG.  Judge Rich reasoned that 
however arbitrary, the title of a book nevertheless describes the book. 
“How else,” he asked, “would you describe it—what else would you 
call it?”67 
Judge Rich also cited policy considerations in refusing registration 
of the title of a book.  He noted: 
The protection accorded the property right in a trademark is not 
limited in time and endures for as long as the trademark is used.  A 
book, once published, is protected against copying only if it is the 
subject of a valid copyright registration and then only until the 
registration expires, so eventually all books fall into the public 
domain.  The right to copy which the law contemplates includes 
the right to call the copy by the only name it has and the title 
cannot be withheld on any theory of trademark right therein.68 
While the title of a single book is not registrable, Judge Rich 
declared, the title of a book series may be registrable.  He explained 
that the name of a series has a trademark function in indicating that 
each book of the series comes from a single source.69 
Judge Rich took a much more expansive approach to the issue of 
trademark subject matter in his opinion for the court in In re Tobias 
Kotzin.70  The applicant in that case sought to register a cloth label of 
elongated rectangular or oblong shape sewed to trousers at a 
                                                          
 66. 254 F.2d 611, 117 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 396 (C.C.P.A. 1958). 
 67. Id. at 615, 117 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 400. 
 68. Id. at 616, 117 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 400.  Cooper was decided prior to January 1, 
1978, the effective date of the Copyright Act of 1976, which provides that copyright 
protection subsists upon fixation of an original work of authorship in a tangible 
medium of expression.  See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).  Cooper was cited approvingly by the 
Federal Circuit in Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, 308 F.3d 1156, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2002).  The Herbko court held that a trademark in the title of a 
single book “would compromise the policy of unrestricted use after expiration of the 
copyright because a book with a trademarked title . . . could be published only under 
a different title.”  Id. at 1164, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1380. Professor McCarthy has 
criticized the Cooper decision. 
While the PTO refuses to register titles of single literary works, such as 
movies, the courts have traditionally protected such titles from infringement 
under the common law of unregistered marks.  The better view is expressed 
in the litigation cases, which will protect a single work title upon acquisition 
of secondary meaning.  This lack of congruence between registration and 
court enforcement impairs the ability of the federal register to reflect the 
reality of the marketplace. 
2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 10:4.1. 
 69. Cooper, 254 F.2d at 611, 117 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 400. 
 70. 276 F.2d 411, 125 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 347 (C.C.P.A. 1960). 
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particular location.  The label included the mark PEGGER but the 
application did not cover use of such mark.  In upholding the refusal 
to register, the Assistant Commissioner held that the distinctive 
location of a label is not a word, name, symbol or device adopted and 
used by one merchant to identify his goods and distinguish them 
from others,71 within the meaning of Section 45 of the Lanham Act.72 
Judge Rich concluded, however, that the applied-for mark could be 
registered, although he found the evidence presented in support of 
registration lacking.  He held that the Section 45 definition of the 
term “trade-mark” was not intended to restrict registrable marks to 
those falling within the terms “word,” “name,” “symbol,” or “device.”  
Although a location per se may not be registered, he remarked, a 
particular tag particularly located on particular goods may be.73 
The slogan “The Weiner the World Awaited,” as used for bacon, 
was held registrable by Judge Rich in In re E. Kahn’s Sons Co.74  The 
examiner refused registration on grounds that the mark is used only 
to call attention to the wieners sold by the applicant and did not 
identify the applicant’s bacon. 
Judge Rich, in reversing the refusal, noted that Section 45 of the 
Lanham Act, in providing that a mark must be used so as “to identify 
his goods,” only requires that the mark identify the goods as his, not 
that the mark identifies the goods.  “In other words, the requirement 
is not that a trademark identify what goods are but where they come 
from.”75  In this case, Judge Rich noted, the specimens of record76 
indicate that the slogan identifies the bacon as from the applicant 
and also serves to distinguish that bacon from bacon made and sold 
by others. 
                                                          
 71. Ex parte Kotzin, 1956 WL 7062, 7062 (Com’r Pat. & Trademarks), 111 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 161 (1956). 
 72. 15 U.S.C. § 1127. 
 73. Judge Rich’s decision in Kotzin was relied upon in finding that LEVI’s pocket 
tab is a protectable mark.  See Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 1978 WL 21731, 
200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 434 (N.D. Cal. 1978), aff’d, 632 F.2d 817, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 
713 (9th Cir. 1980). 
 74. 343 F.2d 475, 145 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 215 (C.C.P.A. 1965). 
 75. Id. at 476, 145 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 216. 
 76. See id. at 476, 145 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 216 (listing as specimens a point of sale 
poster showing bacon slices stacked together and bacon cooked, the words “Hickory-
Smoked BACON,” and the slogan “The Weiner the World Awaited” immediately 
below the word “BACON” and preceded by the words “Another ‘first’ from Kahn’s—
home of”). 
SAMUELS.OFFTOPRINTER 4/7/2007  11:17:52 AM 
778 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:4 
IV. GENERIC/“SO HIGHLY DESCRIPTIVE” TERMS 
Judge Rich’s decision in H. Marvin Ginn Corp. v. International 
Association of Fire Chiefs, Inc.77 provides the starting point for virtually 
all PTO decisions on the issue of genericness.78  Marvin Ginn involved 
a petition to cancel the registration for “Fire Chief,” as used for a 
magazine directed to the field of fire-fighting.  The Trademark Trial 
and Appeal Board found that “Fire Chief” designates a very particular 
and definable target audience for the magazine and, thus, is 
generic.79 
Judge Rich began his analysis by referring to the classic 
formulation of the test for genericness in Judge Learned Hand’s 
decision in Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co.:  “[t]he single question, as I 
view it, in all these cases, is merely one of fact:  what do the buyers 
understand by the word for whose use the parties are contending?”80  
Judge Rich then noted that a recent amendment to the Lanham Act81 
had clarified that it is the “primary significance of the registered mark 
to the relevant public”82 that governs whether a term is generic. 
Determining whether a term is generic, Judge Rich remarked, thus 
requires a two-step inquiry:  (1) what is the genus of the goods or 
services in issue,83 and (2) is the term in issue understood by the 
                                                          
 77. 782 F.2d 987, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 528 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
 78. See, e.g., In re DNI Holdings Ltd., 2005 WL 3492365, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1435 (T.T.A.B. 2005) (deeming SPORTSBETTING.COM for providing of on-line 
casino games to be generic); In re A la Veille Russie, Inc., 2001 WL 862510, 60 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1895 (T.T.A.B. 2001) (deeming the term RUSSIANART  for fine 
art dealership services to be generic); In re Mgmt. Recruiters Int’l Inc., 1986 WL 
83299, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1079 (T.T.A.B. 1986) (deeming SALES CONSULTANTS 
for employment agency services not to be generic). 
 79. Int’l Ass’n of Fire Chiefs, Inc. v. H. Marvin Ginn Corp., 1985 WL 72026, 225 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 940 (T.T.A.B. 1985).  Generic terms are those that identify a certain 
product, as opposed to one specific producer, and are therefore not subject to 
trademark protection.  Descriptive marks, on the other hand, are subject to 
protection upon proof that the mark identifies source, i.e., has achieved secondary 
meaning. 
 80. Marvin Ginn, 782 F.2d at 989, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 530 (quoting Bayer Co. 
v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1921)). 
 81. See Act of Nov. 8, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98 Stat. 3335, 5718-27 (1984). 
 82. Marvin Ginn, 782 F.2d at 989, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 530 (quoting 15 
U.S.C.A. § 1064(c)). 
 83. This factor is often outcome-determinative.  The broader the genus is 
defined, the less likely that the term in issue will be found generic.  Conversely, the 
narrower the genus, the more likely the term will be found generic.  See, e.g., In re 
Boston Beer Co., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1914, 1919 (T.T.A.B. 1998) (reversing a 
refusal to register THE BEST BEER IN AMERICA on grounds of genericness by 
rejecting the contention that the genus is “beers brewed in America that have won 
taste competitions or were judged best in taste tests” as opposed to what was set forth 
in the application, to wit, “beverages, namely beer and ale”).  Professor McCarthy has 
suggested that the definition of “relevant product market” under the antitrust laws 
be applied in defining “genus” for purposes of a genericness analysis.  4 McCARTHY, 
§ 12.24 
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relevant public primarily to refer to that genus of goods or services.84  
In this case, he said, the genus is magazines directed to the field of 
fire-fighting and the evidence does not establish that the relevant 
public refers to a class of fire-fighting magazines as “Fire Chief.”85  
Thus, the court concluded, while FIRE CHIEF may be descriptive, it 
is not generic.86 
The decision of the C.C.P.A., including Judge Rich’s concurrence, 
in In re Sun Oil Co.87 injected much doctrinal confusion into the law.  
Sun Oil applied to register CUSTOM-BLENDED for gasoline.  The 
examiner refused registration on the ground that CUSTOM-
BLENDED is “so highly descriptive” of applicant’s blended gasoline 
product that it is incapable of becoming distinctive.88  In affirming the 
refusal of registration, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board noted 
that while the generic terms for applicant’s blended gasoline are 
“pump-blended” and “multi-grade gasoline,” there is no question that 
CUSTOM-BLENDED will immediately indicate to the public that the 
various grades of gas dispensed are custom-blended to their needs 
and requirements and that, as a result, such a term could be 
registered only upon proof of acquired distinctiveness.89  In other 
words, the Board held CUSTOM-BLENDED merely descriptive, as 
                                                          
 84. Marvin Ginn, 782 F.2d at 990, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 530. 
 85. Id. at 991, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 532. 
 86. Id. 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 532.  The distinction is important because while a 
generic term is not subject to trademark protection, a descriptive term may be 
protected under the trademark laws upon proof of acquired distinctiveness or 
secondary meaning.  See Marvin Ginn, 782 F.2d at 989, 228 U.S.P.Q. at 530 (“A 
generic term is the common descriptive name of a class of goods or services, and, 
while it remains such common descriptive name, it can never be registered as a 
trademark because such a term is ‘merely descriptive’ within the meaning of 
§ 2(e)(1) and is incapable of acquiring de jure distinctiveness under § 2(f).”).  In 
Cicena Ltd. v. Columbia Telecomms. Group, 900 F.2d 1546, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1401 (Fed. Cir. 1990), in ruling on a question of first impression in the Second 
Circuit (the case was appealed to the Federal Circuit because, in addition to 
presenting a claim under the Lanham Act, the complaint also alleged design patent 
infringement), Judge Rich rejected the theory of “secondary meaning in the 
making.”  The purpose of such theory is to protect a plaintiff who has spent money to 
create a secondary meaning, but has not yet succeeded, from those who attempt to 
usurp whatever goodwill the plaintiff has established.  Judge Rich noted, however, 
that “[t]o allow a plaintiff to succeed on the theory of secondary meaning in the 
making would undermine the entire purpose of the secondary meaning 
requirement:  to show that the public associates the product with a source rather 
than with the product itself.”  Id. at 1550, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1405.  Judge Rich’s 
view proved prescient as the Second Circuit, in Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc., 964 
F.2d 131, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d 1811 (2d Cir. 1992), also rejected the doctrine of secondary 
meaning in the making. 
 87. 426 F.2d 401, 165 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 718 (C.C.P.A. 1970). 
 88. Id. at 402, 165 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 718. 
 89. 155 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 600 (T.T.A.B. 1967). 
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opposed to generic.  The C.C.P.A. affirmed based on the opinion of 
the Board.90 
In his concurring opinion, Judge Rich held that registration should 
be refused even if there was evidence of acquired distinctiveness or 
secondary meaning.91  In Judge Rich’s opinion, CUSTOM-BLENDED 
is “so highly descriptive” that it cannot be protected. 
Whether a mark may be denied registration because it is “so highly 
descriptive” as to be incapable of serving as a mark appears to be an 
open question today.  Under prevailing case law, marks may be 
classified into a number of categories, including arbitrary, suggestive, 
descriptive, and generic.92  The Lanham Act does not provide for 
refusals to register based on a finding that a mark is “so highly 
descriptive” as to be incapable.  There is no category in between 
descriptive and generic.93  However, the Federal Circuit, in a decision 
issued several months after Judge Rich’s death, appears to have 
revived the “so highly descriptive” categorization as a ground of 
refusal.94 
V. CONCURRENT USE 
One of the most problematic issues in trademark law is 
determining the respective rights of concurrent users of the same or 
similar marks in different parts of the country.  Judge Rich explored 
                                                          
 90. 426 F.2d at 403, 165 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 719. 
 91. Under such circumstances, Judge Rich held that such evidence would merely 
constitute “de facto” (as opposed to de jure) secondary meaning and, as a matter of 
law, could not support registration.  426 F.2d at 403, 165 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 719 
(Rich, J., concurring).  Judge Fisher (sitting by designation) dissented, finding that 
the evidence of secondary meaning established that CUSTOM-BLENDED is 
registrable.  Id. at 404, 165 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 720 (Fisher, J., dissenting). 
 92. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9, 189 U.S.P.Q. 
(BNA) 759, 764 (2d Cir. 1976) (“The cases. . . identify four different categories of 
terms with respect to trade-mark protection.”). 
 93. See In re Women’s Publ’g Co., 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1876, 1877 n.2 (T.T.A.B. 
1992) (“The Examining Attorney’s refusal that applicant’s mark is ‘so highly 
descriptive that it is incapable of acting as a trademark’ is not technically a statutory 
ground of refusal.”); see also TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURES, 
§ 1209.01(c)(ii), TERMINOLOGY (4th ed. 2005) (stating use of the “so highly 
descriptive that it is incapable of acting as a trademark” language “may lead to 
confusion and should be avoided”). 
 94. See In re Boston Beer Co., 198 F.3d 1370, 1373-74, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1056, 
1058 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (upholding a refusal to register THE BEST BEER IN 
AMERICA mark because it is “so highly laudatory and descriptive . . . that the slogan 
does not and could not function as a trademark . . . .”).  Interestingly, the decision of 
the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board in the Boston Beer case was careful to hold 
that it was “not resurrecting the discredited notion that a term can be the ‘apt 
descriptive name’ for a product, and, therefore be ‘so highly descriptive as to be 
unregistrable’.”  47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1914, 1920 (T.T.A.B. 1998) (citing In re K-T 
Zoe Furniture Inc., 16 F.3d 398, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1994); In re 
Rickett & Colman, N. Am., Inc., 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1389 (T.T.A.B. 1991)). 
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this issue in his opinion for the court in Weiner King, Inc. v. The Wiener 
King Corp.95  The facts are rather convoluted:  Weiner King first used 
the mark WIENER KING in 1962 at restaurants located in 
Flemington, New Jersey, but did not apply for federal registration 
until May 1975.96  A North Carolina company, Weiner King Corp. 
(“WKNC”), began using the WIENER KING mark in 1970 in North 
Carolina in connection with restaurant services.  At the time it 
adopted its mark, WKNC did not know of Weiner King and, in May 
1972, WKNC obtained registrations for its marks.  WKNC learned of 
Weiner King’s use of the WEINER KING mark in July 1972 and 
subsequent thereto expanded its operations throughout the United 
States, including New Jersey.  Weiner King petitioned to cancel 
WKNC’s registrations and filed territorially unrestricted applications 
to register the mark WEINER KING.  Weiner King then sued WKNC 
for trademark infringement.  The district court granted Weiner King 
a preliminary injunction barring WKNC from using its mark within 
twenty miles of Weiner King’s restaurants and also ordered the 
cancellation of WKNC’s registrations.97  The Trademark Trial and 
Appeal Board, thereafter, granted Weiner King’s petitions to cancel 
to the extent that WKNC’s registrations were restricted to exclude 
Weiner King’s trading area.98  The Board also recommended that 
Weiner King’s applications be denied unless they were amended to 
reflect an area of right to use within a fifteen-mile radius of 
Flemington, New Jersey.99 
Applying equitable and common law trademark principles, as well 
as the policy and substance of the Lanham Act, the C.C.P.A, per 
Judge Rich, affirmed the decision of the Trademark Trial and Appeal 
Board.  Under the Tea Rose/Rectanus doctrine,100 Judge Rich noted, 
each party has the right to use its mark in its own initial area of use.  
The case was made more complicated, he pointed out, by the fact 
                                                          
 95. 615 F.2d 512, 204 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 820 (C.C.P.A. 1980). 
 96. Id. at 515, 204 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 823. 
 97. 407 F. Supp. 1274, 190 U.S.P.Q. 469 (D.N.J. 1976).  But see Weiner King, Inc. 
v. The Wiener King Corp., 192 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 353 (3d Cir. 1976) (modifying the 
injunction to bar WKNC from using its mark within fifteen miles of Flemington, New 
Jersey). 
 98. Weiner King, Inc. v. The Wiener King Corp., 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 894 
(T.T.A.B. 1976). 
 99. Id. at 917. 
 100. Under the so-called Tea Rose/Rectanus doctrine, a good faith junior user of 
a mark in a remote geographical area from that occupied by the senior user may 
establish priority over a senior user’s claim to the mark in the junior user’s area.  The 
doctrine is named after two early Supreme Court decisions, Hanover Star Milling Co. 
v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916), and United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 
90 (1918). 
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that, while WKNC was the junior user and an innocent adopter, it was 
nevertheless the first to register the mark and it expanded its use 
after learning of Weiner King’s prior use.  Weiner King contended 
that the fact that WKNC expanded even though it knew of Weiner 
King’s prior user should bar it from being recognized as a concurrent 
user in any areas entered after notice.  Judge Rich disagreed: 
It is said that nature abhors a vacuum.  The same may be said of 
equity; it must operate in a factual environment.  The TTAB had 
the task of balancing the equities between a prior user who 
remained content to operate a small, locally-oriented business with 
no apparent desire to expand, and who, until recently, declined to 
seek the benefits of Lanham Act registration, and a subsequent 
user, whose expressed purpose has been, from its inception, to 
expand into a nationwide franchising operation, and who has 
fulfilled its purpose, taking advantage of Lanham Act registration 
in the process. 
[* * *] 
The only basis urged by Weiner King for absence of good faith on 
the part of WKNC is the fact that WKNC expanded out of North 
Carolina with notice of Weiner King’s existence and use of its 
WEINER KING mark.  We hold that this reason is legally 
insufficient to support a finding of bad faith . . . .  While an attempt 
to “palm off,” or a motive to ‘box in’ a prior user by cutting into its 
probable area of expansion, each necessarily flowing from 
knowledge of the existence of the prior user, might be sufficient to 
support a finding of bad faith, mere knowledge of the existence of the 
prior user should not, by itself, constitute bad faith.101 
Judge Rich also deemed it significant that WKNC was the first to 
register the mark.  Public policy is advanced in encouraging prompt 
registration of marks, he remarked, quoting from the court’s opinion 
in In re Beatrice Foods Co.: 
Where the prior user does not apply for a registration before 
registration is granted to another, there may be valid grounds, 
based on a policy of rewarding those who first seek federal 
registration, and a consideration of the rights created by the 
existing registration, for limiting his registration to the area of 
actual use and permitting the prior registrant to retain the 
nationwide protection of the act restricted only by the territory of 
the prior user.102 
                                                          
 101. Weiner King, 615 F.2d at 522, 204 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 829. 
 102. Id. at 523-24, 204 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 830 (quoting from In re Beatrice Foods 
Co., 429 F.2d 466, 474 n.13, 166 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 431, 436 n.13 (C.C.P.A. 1970)). 
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VI. “DAMAGE” 
Under Section 13 of the Lanham Act,103 an opposition may be filed 
by any person who believes he would be “damaged” by the 
registration of the mark on the principal register.  In his decision in 
Otto Roth & Co. v. Universal Foods Corp.,104 Judge Rich explained that 
the concept of damage is tied to the grounds upon which the 
opposer asserts damage.  He noted, for example, that in an 
opposition based on the allegation that the published mark is merely 
descriptive, any use by the opposer may be sufficient to preclude 
registration.  Under such circumstances, the opposer is trying to 
prevent a claim of exclusive ownership of the mark, asserting a 
privilege that the opposer holds in common with all others to the free 
use of the language. 
However, Judge Rich continued, in an opposition based on Section 
2(d) of the Lanham Act,105 the opposer is attempting to protect his 
individual rights. In this situation, Judge Rich declared, the opposer 
must prove he has proprietary rights in the term he relies upon to 
establish a likelihood of confusion.106 
In Otto Roth, the basis of the opposition was likelihood of 
confusion.  The opposer relied on its prior use of a mark that had 
been denied registration on grounds it was merely descriptive.  
Despite the fact that opposer’s mark was merely descriptive, the 
Board concluded that opposer had standing to oppose under Section 
2(d).  In sustaining the opposition, the Board stated that prior use of 
a term in a descriptive sense is sufficient to successfully oppose 
registration provided:  (1) there is a likelihood of confusion, or 
(2) that registration would frustrate the opposer’s right to use the 
term in a descriptive sense unhindered and free from harassment.107 
According to Judge Rich: 
Absent a requirement in the first part of the board’s test that the 
user of that term demonstrate that it identifies source and a 
requirement in the second part that what applicant seeks to 
register is a descriptive term (or its equivalent), the statement is 
statutorily untenable . . . .  Parts (1) and (2) of the above test are 
mutually exclusive considerations and the misjudgment of the 
                                                          
 103. 15 U.S.C. § 1063 (2006). 
 104. 640 F.2d 1317, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 40 (C.C.P.A. 1981). 
 105. See supra note 6. 
 106. Otto Roth, 640 F.2d at 1320, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 43. 
 107. Lankor Int’l, Inc. v. Otto Roth & Co., 204 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 941 (T.T.A.B. 
1979) (digest only). 
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board in formulating that statement was to combine, respectively, 
Sections 2(d) and 2(e)(1) into one measure of registrability.108 
In another case on damage, Morehouse Manufacturing Corp. v. J. 
Strickland & Co.,109 Judge Rich determined, as a matter of law, that an 
opposer is not damaged by the issuance of a second registration 
where applicant already has an existing registration for the same 
mark for the same goods.  This proposition is referred to as the 
“Morehouse” defense. 
VII.     FRAUD 
Judge Rich, in Morehouse, also offered a number of important 
observations regarding the issue of fraud.  The issue came up in the 
context of a Section 8 affidavit of continued use in which the 
registrant, instead of submitting a specimen showing current use of 
the mark, submitted an earlier, discontinued label.  The affidavit 
indicated that a specimen of the mark “as now actually being used” is 
attached. Based on these facts, it was argued that the registration 
should be canceled on grounds of either fraud or that the registrant 
did not make a showing of current use, as required by the statute. 
Judge Rich was not persuaded, observing that the evidence 
established that the registrant was still using the registered mark on 
the same goods for which it was registered.  Judge Rich emphasized 
that the purpose of Section 8 affidavits is to remove from the register 
marks that are no longer in use.  “Given the fact of continuing use, 
from which practically all of the user’s substantive trademark rights 
derive, nothing is to be gained from and no public purpose is served 
by canceling the registration of a technically good trademark because 
of a minor technical defect in an affidavit.”110 
                                                          
 108. Otto Roth, 640 F.2d at 1320-21, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 43-44; see also House of 
Worsted-Tex, Inc. v. Superba Cravats, Inc., 284 F.2d 528, 128 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 119 
(C.C.P.A. 1960) (finding opposer lacked standing to maintain opposition based on 
common law rights in mark IVY LEAGUE for clothing since opposer failed to 
establish proprietary rights in term); DeWalt, Inc. v. Magna Power Tool Corp., 289 
F.2d 656, 129 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 275 (C.C.P.A. 1960) (basing analysis for asserting 
freedom to use descriptive term on factual circumstances when registration is sought 
rather than applicant’s mere reliance on Section 2(f) to obtain registration of 
descriptive term in order to defeat opposer’s claim of standing).  See generally In re 
Thunderbird Prods. Corp., 406 F.2d 1389, 160 U.S.P.Q. 730 (C.C.P.A. 1969) 
(declaring that whether a mark is descriptive must be determined based upon 
evidence at the point when the issue of registrability is under consideration by the 
Patent Office). 
 109. 407 F.2d 881, 160 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 715 (C.C.P.A. 1969). 
 110. Id. at 888, 160 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 720; cf. Duffy-Mott Co., Inc. v. Cumberland 
Packing Co., 424 F.2d 1095, 165 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 422 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (refusing, on 
grounds of “unclean hands,” to permit opposer to rely on a registration that was 
subject to a false Section 15 declaration (i.e., registrant included goods on which the 
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The court also distinguished fraud in trademark cases from fraud 
in patent cases. Judge Rich pointed out that every right of a patentee 
flows from rights granted by the Patent Office.  However, trademark 
rights flow from use, not from registration: 
It is in the public interest to maintain registrations of technically 
good trademarks on the register so long as they are still in use.  
The register then reflects commercial reality.  Assertions of “fraud” 
should be dealt with realistically, comprehending . . . that 
trademark rights, unlike patent rights continue notwithstanding 
cancellation of those additional rights which the Patent Office is 
empowered by statute to grant.111 
Judge Rich authored one other noteworthy decision on fraud. In 
Rosso & Mastracco, Inc. v. Giant Food Inc.,112 Judge Rich rejected a 
claim of fraud based on an applicant’s failure to identify a junior user 
in its application.  While he acknowledged that an applicant has a 
duty to continuously review and amend the oath113 filed with the 
application, he pointed out that a senior user ordinarily need not 
identify junior users in the oath unless the rights of such junior users 
are clearly established.114 
VIII. LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION 
For the most part, Judge Rich’s jurisprudence on the issue of 
likelihood of confusion reflected prevailing law.  Thus, for example, 
his decisions note that the issue of likelihood of confusion must be 
decided on the basis of the marks and goods and/or services set forth 
                                                          
mark was not in use)).  In Duffy-Mott, Judge Rich explained that under Section 15, 
the incontestability provision, registrant’s right to use a mark becomes incontestable 
for the goods on which the mark has been in continuous use for five consecutive 
years and is still in use.  “This is not a question of maintaining the registration in 
force, which can be done by an affidavit under Section 8(a) . . . without naming any 
particular goods. . . . It is a matter of acquiring a new right with respect to the goods 
specifically recited in the affidavit.”  424 F.2d at 1099-1100, 165 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 
425 (emphasis in original).  Duffy-Mott was decided prior to the amendment to the 
Lanham Act that now requires a Section 8 affidavit to “set[] forth those goods or 
services recited in the registration on or in connection with which the mark is in use 
in commerce . . . .”  See 15 U.S.C. § 1058 (2006). 
 111. Morehouse, 407 F.2d at 888, 160 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 720 (emphasis in original). 
 112. 720 F.2d 1263, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1050 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 113. The oath then in effect required an applicant to aver: 
no other person, firm, corporation, or association, to the best of his 
knowledge and belief, has the right to use such mark in commerce, either in 
the identical form thereof or in such near resemblance thereto as to be 
likely, when applied to the goods of such other person, to cause confusion, 
or to cause mistake, or to deceive. 
Id. at 1266, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1053 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(1) (1976); 37 
C.F.R. § 2.33(b) (1982). 
 114. Id., 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1053. 
SAMUELS.OFFTOPRINTER 4/7/2007  11:17:52 AM 
786 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:4 
in the application and cited registration(s),115 that any doubt is 
resolved against the newcomer,116 that likelihood of confusion is not 
decided on the basis of a side-by-side comparison of the marks,117 that 
absent evidence of use, third-party registrations are entitled to little 
weight in resolving the issue of likelihood of confusion,118 and that 
the fact that one mark may call another to mind does not by itself 
establish a likelihood of confusion.119 Many of his decisions relied 
heavily on the sophistication, or lack thereof, of the relevant 
purchasing public.120  Judge Rich also emphasized that what is 
                                                          
 115. See, e.g., Luzier Inc. v. Marlyn Chem. Co., Inc., 442 F.2d 973, 974, 169 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 797 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (“There is nothing in opposer’s registration nor 
in the description of goods in applicant’s applications to restrict the goods to any 
price range, method of marketing, packaging quantities, or class of purchasers.”); 
Tropic-Aire, Inc. v. Approved Prods., Inc., 275 F.2d 728, 731, 125 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 
182, 185 (C.C.P.A. 1960) (“These registrations must be considered under Section 
2(d) of the Trademark Act . . . notwithstanding the evidence that tends to show the 
registrant is no longer using the mark on some of the goods enumerated therein.”); 
General Shoe Corp. v. Lerner Bros. Mfg. Co., Inc., 254 F.2d 154, 157, 117 U.S.P.Q. 
(BNA) 281, 284 (C.C.P.A. 1957) (“Even though the net effect of the evidence of 
record may be to create the impression that opposer is now primarily concerned 
commercially with women’s shoes under the ‘Holiday’ mark, we do not feel that this 
can be controlling of the issue so long as the opposer’s earlier registration of 
“Holiday’ is not so limited.”). 
 116. See, e.g., In re Pneumatiques, Caoutchouc Manufacture et Plastiques Kleber-
Colombes, 487 F.2d 918, 920, 179 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 729, 730 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (“[T]he 
rule that doubt as to likelihood of confusion shall be resolved against the newcomer 
has been applied in the Patent Office in ex parte cases from an early time . . . .”); 
Planters Nut & Chocolate Co. v. Crown Nut Co., Inc., 305 F.2d 916, 920, 134 U.S.P.Q. 
(BNA) 504, 508 (C.C.P.A. 1962) (“[W]here there is doubt the court resolves it 
against the newcomer.”). 
 117. See, e.g., Geigy Chem. Corp. v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1005, 1007, 
169 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 39, 40 (C.C.P.A. 1971) ([W]hat the statute prescribes . . . is 
whether the marks so resemble one another as to be likely to cause confusion or 
mistake, and this requires us to consider . . . the fallibility of memory over a period of 
time, not merely whether one can distinguish the marks at a given moment.”); Rex 
Shoe Co., Inc. v. Juvenile Shoe Corp., 273 F.2d 179, 180, 124 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 173 
(C.C.P.A. 1959) (“The issue here is not likelihood that purchasers would confuse the 
marks on a side-by-side comparison.). 
 118. See, e.g., Stanadyne, Inc. v. Lins, 490 F.2d 1396, 1397, 180 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 
649, 650 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (“[M]ere registrations are entitled to little weight in 
establishing whether there is likely to be confusion because registrations by 
themselves do not indicate how the public mind may have been conditioned.”). 
 119. See, e.g., In re Ferrero, 479 F.2d 1395, 1397, 178 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 167, 168 
(C.C.P.A. 1973) (“Seeing a yellow traffic light immediately ‘calls to mind’ the green 
that has gone and the red that is to come, or vice versa; that does not mean that 
confusion is being caused.  As we are conditioned, it means exactly the opposite.”). 
 120. See, e.g., Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 432 F.2d 1400, 1402, 
167 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 529, 531 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (Rich, J., dissenting) (“With respectful 
deference for the views of the majority, I cannot agree that a reasonable likelihood of 
confusion does not exist in the concurrent use of PEAK and PEAK PERIOD on the 
two consumer products here involved—dentifrice and deodorant.  These are both 
low-cost, consumer-purchased, shelf items in the same category of merchandise, sold 
in the same departments of the same stores for the related uses of personal hygiene, 
bought by persons of all degrees of intelligence and perspicacity—some of them 
careless.”); Clayton Mark & Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 356 F.2d 943, 944, 148 
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important in a likelihood of confusion analysis “is not whether people 
will necessarily confuse the marks, but whether the marks will be 
likely to confuse people into believing that the goods they are 
purchasing emanate from the same source.”121 
The one issue in which Judge Rich’s views fall outside the 
mainstream concerns the effect of a strong or famous mark on the 
question of likelihood of confusion.  While the prevailing case law 
accords strong marks broad protection,122 Judge Rich took a contrary 
view.  For example, in his dissent in Jiffy, Inc. v. Jordan Industries, 
Inc.,123 involving the well-known JIFFY mark for peanut butter, Judge 
Rich commented that “[t]he better known [the mark] is, the less 
likelihood of confusion there would be . . . .”124  And, in B.V.D. 
Licensing Corp. v. Body  Action Design, Inc.,125 Judge Rich, writing for the 
court, concluded that the fame of the BVD mark for men’s 
underwear undercut a claim of likelihood of confusion with the use 
of B A D for clothing.  Judge Rich reasoned that the better known a 
mark is, the more likely the public becomes aware of even a small 
difference in the marks. 
IX. DESCRIPTIVENESS 
Writing for the majority126 of the court in Minnesota Mining & 
Manufacturing Co. v. Johnson & Johnson,127 Judge Rich determined that 
the mark SKINVISIBLE, as used on transparent adhesive tape 
through which the skin is visible, was not merely descriptive under 
Section 2(e)(1) of the statute.  Judge Rich noted that SKINVISIBLE is 
highly suggestive in that it suggests that the skin is visible through the 
goods to which the mark is applied and also suggests the quality of 
                                                          
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 672, 673 (C.C.P.A. 1966) (“Purchase of ‘MARK 75’ breakers would 
therefore be on a very discriminating basis, by persons who not only know what they 
are buying and why but who is producing it.”). 
 121. Kangol Ltd. v. Kangaroos U.S.A., Inc., 974 F.2d 161, 163, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1945, 1946 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see also Am. Cyanamid Co. v. U.S. Rubber Co., 
356 F.2d 1008, 1009, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 729, 730 (C.C.P.A. 1966) (noting that 
Section 2(d) is not limited to confusion as to the origin of the goods, “though that is 
the question most often presented”). 
 122. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. QSC Audio Prods. Inc., 293 F.3d 1367, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (stating that the Board erred in discounting fame of 
opposer’s marks); Kenner Parker Toys v. Rose Art Indus., Inc., 963 F.2d 350, 353, 22 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1453, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“[A] mark with extensive public 
recognition and renown deserves and receives more legal protection than an obscure 
or weak mark.”). 
 123. 481 F.2d 1323, 179 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 169 (C.C.P.A. 1973). 
 124. Id. at 1327, 179 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 172 (Rich, J., dissenting). 
 125. 846 F.2d 727, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1719 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
 126. Judge Baldwin concurred and Judges Lane and Almond dissented. 
 127. 454 F.2d 1179, 172 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 491 (C.C.P.A. 1972). 
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invisibility in the tape.  He pointed out, however, that a valid mark 
may be highly suggestive.  Judge Rich further observed that 
SKINVISIBLE is not a dictionary term but, rather, a term coined by 
the applicant and that the evidence did not show that the term had 
become part of the language.  Under such circumstances, he 
concluded, providing protection to SKINVISIBLE would not deprive 
competitors of the right to use the language in a normal manner. 
In another case, Remington Products, Inc. v. North American Philips 
Corp.,128 Judge Rich determined that TRAVEL CARE, as used for 
electric travel irons and wrinkle remover/fabric steamers, was merely 
descriptive.  He observed that the applicant conceded that the term 
“travel personal care” is merely descriptive for the goods and then 
determined that merely omitting the word “personal” does not 
convert the mark into one that is registrable.  The evidence, Judge 
Rich pointed out, makes clear that “travel care” is a category 
designation for a class of goods. 
Judge Rich also issued opinions on the issue of geographical 
descriptiveness or misdescriptiveness.  In one case,129 Judge Rich 
determined that AMERICAN BEAUTY for sewing machines and parts 
that were made in Japan was geographically deceptively 
misdescriptive under the then wording of Section 2(e)(2)130 of the 
Lanham Act.  While a majority of the Trademark Trial and Appeal 
Board held that the common meaning of the term “American 
Beauty” is that of a well-known rose, and, thus, that the mark is not 
“primarily” geographically deceptively misdescriptive,131 the C.C.P.A. 
concluded that “American Beauty” has more than one “primary” 
meaning.  Reviewing the specimens of use,132 Judge Rich found that 
                                                          
 128. 892 F.2d 1576, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
 129. Singer Mfg. Co. v. Birginal-Bigsby Corp., 319 F.2d 273, 138 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 
63 (C.C.P.A. 1963). 
 130. At the time Singer was decided, Section 2(e)(2) provided a basis for refusal of 
a mark “which, . . . when applied to the goods of the applicant . . . is primarily 
geographically descriptive or deceptively misdescriptive of them.”  15 U.S.C. 
§ 1052(e)(2).  Singer was also decided prior to the landmark decision of the C.C.P.A. 
in In re Nantucket, Inc., 677 F.2d 95, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 889 (C.C.P.A. 1982), in 
which the court required evidence of a goods/place association before a mark could 
be refused registration as either primarily geographically descriptive or 
misdescriptive.  In In re Cal. Innovations, Inc., 329 F.3d 1334, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1853 (Fed. Cir. 2003), the court held that, in order to support a refusal under 
current Section 2(e)(3) of the Lanham Act on grounds the mark is primarily 
geographically deceptively misdescriptive, the PTO also would have to show public 
deception that is material to the consumer’s decision to purchase. 
 131. Singer Mfg. Co. v. Birginal-Bigsby Corp., 132 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 471 (T.T.A.B. 
1961). 
 132. The specimens showed the words AMERICAN BEAUTY applied in large 
prominent type on the arm of sewing machine heads and ads that used such 
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the words AMERICAN BEAUTY conveyed the impression of a 
beautiful sewing machine made in America. 
Judge Rich, writing for the Federal Circuit, also concluded that the 
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board erred in holding that VITTEL for 
cosmetic products was primarily geographically descriptive.133  The 
examiner, in support of the refusal, cited geographical references 
that show that Vittel is a town in northeast France that is known as a 
watering place, spa, and resort.  In reversing, the court concluded 
that the evidence established that “Vittel” would not be perceived as a 
geographic term by the American cosmetic-purchasing public: 
We think the evidence is inadequate to show that the bulk of 
cosmetics purchasers, or even a significant portion of them, would, 
upon seeing the word Vittel on a bottle of skin lotion or the like, 
conclude that it is a place name and that the lotion came from 
there, rather than simply a trademark or trade name of a 
manufacturer . . . .134 
X. OTHER NOTEWORTHY DECISIONS 
Under Section 44(d) of the Lanham Act, a foreign trademark 
owner may be entitled to file a U.S. trademark application based on 
its earlier-filed national application if the U.S. application is filed 
within six months from the date on which the application was first 
filed in the foreign country.  Such registration may mature into a U.S. 
registration either upon proof of use in the United States or proof of 
ownership of a corresponding foreign registration in the applicant’s 
country of origin.  In In re De Luxe,135 a Dutch company, Balmain, filed 
an application with the PTO on November 25, 1987, to register the 
mark IVOIRE DE BALMAIN.  The application was based on a 
pending Benelux136 application.  Balmain then submitted to the PTO 
a copy of the corresponding Dutch registration on April 7, 1989.  On 
August 2, 1989, Balmain assigned its U.S. application to De Luxe, a 
foreign company.  The examiner then required De Luxe to establish 
that it owned the corresponding Benelux registration.  De Luxe was 
unable to do so, and the examiner refused registration.  The 
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board affirmed on the ground that De 
                                                          
expressions as “The American Beauty—the world’s most precious—Automatic Zig-
Zag Sewing Machine.”  Singer, 319 F.2d at 275, 138 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 65. 
 133. See In re Societe Generale Des Eaux Minerales De Vittel S.A., 824 F.2d 957, 3 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1450 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
 134. Id. at 959, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1452. 
 135. 990 F.2d 607, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1475 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 136. The Benelux registry is the common trademark registry for Belgium, 
Netherlands, and Luxembourg. 
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Luxe, while the owner of the U.S. application, was not also, at the 
time of publication, the owner of the foreign registration on which 
the U.S. registration is based. 
 Deciding an issue of “first impression,” the court, per Judge Rich, 
concluded that a foreign applicant must comply with the 
requirements of Section 44 only at the time the application is filed.  
After the application is filed, the foreign applicant may freely alienate 
its U.S. application without also assigning foreign rights.137 
 Judge Rich’s opinion for the court in In re ECCS, Inc.138 reflected 
what he termed “the most fundamental aspect of U.S. trademark law, 
namely, that trademark ownership and attendant rights are acquired 
in the marketplace by use and that. . . the Lanham Act . . . provides 
only for registration of existing marks.”139  The case arose out of a 
conflict between the mark, as reflected in the specimens, and the 
mark as it appeared on the drawing page.  On the specimens, the 
mark appeared as:   
  EXA 
        MODULE 
On the drawing, the mark appeared as EXAMODULE.  The 
examiner refused registration on grounds the drawing differed from 
the specimen.  The applicant’s attempts to amend the drawing to 
show the mark as EXA MODULE were rejected by the examiner 
because such amendment constituted a material alteration of the 
mark, in violation of then Trademark Rule 2.72(a). 
Judge Rich determined, however, that then Trademark Rule 
2.72(b) permitted amendments to a drawing if warranted by the 
specimens.  He noted that the specimens show what mark is sought to 
be registered and that: 
It seems only a matter of common sense and sound trademark law 
that the specimens show what mark is owned by the applicant, 
ownership being a prerequisite to registration, and that one should 
look to the specimens, in a case of inconsistency, to determine what 
                                                          
 137. This situation is to be contrasted with that where a Section 44 application is 
filed by a foreign national and later assigned to a U.S. company.  In that situation, 
the Section 44 application is considered void since a U.S. company cannot register a 
mark in the United States under Section 44.  See Karsten Mfg. Co. v. Editoy AG, 79 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1783 (T.T.A.B. 2006). 
 138. 94 F.3d 1578, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 2001 (Fed. Cir. 1996).  In the interest of full 
disclosure, one of the authors of this Article served as co-counsel for the applicant in 
this case. 
 139. Id. at 1579, 39 U.S.P.Q. at 2002. 
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an applicant wishes to register, not to a clearly inconsistent and 
erroneous drawing . . . .140 
CONCLUSION 
Giles Sutherland Rich left a rich legacy in the field of trademark 
law.  His jurisprudence in the area recognizes the fundamental 
principle that trademark rights in the United States are acquired by 
use and, that as a result, the law should be applied and interpreted in 
light of commercial reality.  The PTO best fulfills its public mission, 
he argued, by registering marks, not by second-guessing those in the 
marketplace in a misguided zeal to protect the public interest.  In 
such a fashion, Judge Rich contended, the public notice function of 
the trademark register is advanced, the rights of trademark owners 
are best protected, and public confusion is avoided. 
Judge Rich’s opinions clarified the law in a number of important 
respects. Many of his decisions, particularly Morton-Norwich,141 Marvin 
Ginn,142 and Otto Roth,143 and the principles set forth therein, have 
withstood the test of time and continue to serve as basic guiding posts 
for the PTO in its administration of the federal registration system. 
 
                                                          
 140. Id. at 1581, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d at 2004.  The court’s decision did not sit very well 
with the PTO.  Effective October 30, 1999, Rule 2.72 was amended to prohibit 
amendments that materially alter the mark on the drawing filed with the original 
application.  37 C.F.R. § 2.72.  Also, Trademark Rule 2.52 was amended to state that 
the “drawing depicts the mark sought to be registered.”  37 C.F.R. § 2.52.  Thus, the 
PTO no longer accepts amendments to cure internal inconsistencies if these 
amendments materially alter the mark on the original drawing. 
 141. See supra note 57. 
 142. See supra note 77. 
 143. See supra note 104. 
